

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07602 01 OF 04 281312Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----003235 281323Z /41

O 281220Z SEP 78  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7895  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 07602

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

USUN FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, JO, US, XF  
SUBJECT: CAMP DAVID FOLLOW UP: ATHERTON MEETING WITH  
KING HUSSEIN

1. AMB. VELIOTES AND I, ACCOMPANIED BY TWINAM AND DCM  
SUDDARTH, SPENT SLIGHTLY OVER AN HOUR WITH KING HUSSEIN  
LATE AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 27. KING HAD CROWN PRINCE HASSAN,  
COURT MINISTER SHARAF AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ABU ODEH  
PRESENT. WE FOUND KING STILL REFLECTING HURT AT HAVING  
BEEN PRESENTED WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI IN CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS  
AND AGGRAVATED BY SADAT'S LACK OF CONSULTATIONS.

2. I INDICATED THAT SECRETARY HAD WANTED ME TO REPORT TO  
KING ON HIS VISITS TO RIYADH AND DAMASCUS AND MY SUB-  
SEQUENT TRAVELS AND TO CONVEY ANY VIEWS THAT HUSSEIN  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 07602 01 OF 04 281312Z

MIGHT HAVE ON BASIS OF HIS OWN CONTACTS SINCE SECRETARY  
WAS IN AMMAN.

3. AT KING'S REQUEST, I BRIEFED HIM AT SOME LENGTH ON OUR  
CONVERSATIONS POST SECRETARY'S AMMAN STOP. I NOTED THAT  
IN SAUDI ARABIA FAHD HAD GIVEN SECRETARY A GENERAL  
RESPONSE QUITE POSITIVE IN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT'S PEACE

EFFORTS, AND HAD INDICATED REALIZATION THAT CAMP DAVID OUTCOME WAS IMPORTANT NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE. AT SAME TIME, FAHD HAD EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO PLO, LACK OF EMPHASIS ON THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIANS OUTSIDE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND LACK OF ASSURANCE THAT PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. HUSSEIN INTERRUPTED TO ASK IF SAUDIS HAD NOT REFERRED TO LACK OF MENTION OF JERUSALEM IN AGREEMENTS, AND I SAID THAT THEY HAD AND THAT SECRETARY HAD EXPLAINED BACKGROUND OF THIS OMISSION. I STRESSED THAT FAHD HAD WISHED PRESIDENT WELL IN HIS DETERMINATION TO PURSUE PEACE PROCESS. I DESCRIBED PRESENT SAUDI POSITION AS ONE OF REFLECTION BEFORE TAKING FINAL POSITION AT CAMP DAVID.

4. I NOTED THAT IN DAMASCUS SECRETARY AND ASSAD HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF LEBANON. I CHARACTERIZED IT AS USEFUL IN BRINGING OUT THE BASIC AGREEMENT OF U. S./SYRIAN OBJECTIVES AND ALLAYING CERTAIN SUSPICIONS WHICH HAD GROWN IN SYRIAN MIND ABOUT WHAT U. S. IS SEEKING THERE. I SAID THAT BULK OF FOUR AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING WITH ASSAD WAS DEVOTED TO CAMP DAVID, THAT IT WAS A FRANK EXCHANGE WITH DIRECT QUESTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF POSITION. I MENTIONED THAT THE MEETING WAS VERY CORDIAL, COMING RIGHT AFTER "STEADFASTNESS" COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN ISSUED IN DAMASCUS INDICATING U. S. SHOULD BE TREATED AS AN "ENEMY." ASSAD HAD STUDIED AGREE-  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 07602 01 OF 04 281312Z

MENTS CAREFULLY AND ASKED PERCEPTIVE QUESTIONS, WHICH THE SECRETARY HAD ANSWERED WITH EMPHASIS ON OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE WHICH CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT PRESENT. I STATED THAT AFTER OBTAINING CLARIFICATION, ASSAD HAD STATED SYRIAN POSITION AS ONE OF OPPOSITION TO AGREEMENTS BECAUSE THEY APPEARED TO HIM TO FAVOR ISRAEL'S POSITION, TO REFLECT SADAT'S DESIRE FOR A SEPARATE PEACE, TO GIVE INADEQUATE PROTECTION TO PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, AND DID NOT MENTION GOLAN PROBLEM. I NOTED THAT SECRETARY HAD POINTED OUT HOW AGREEMENTS APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL TO ALL FRONTS. I SAID ASSAD HAD PUT GREAT STRESS ON THE NEED FOR RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND A ROLE FOR THE PLO. I EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT ASSAD HAD MADE STRONG STATEMENT TO US OF HIS DESIRE TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH US AND THAT HE HAD STRESSED COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE PEACE ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 338, WHICH I DESCRIBED AS ASSAD'S WAY OF INDICATING ADHERENCE TO 242, AND UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE U. N. OR IN THE GENEVA FORUM.

5. I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT IN KUWAIT I HAD MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS AS SECRETARY IN RIYADH AND THAT PRINCIPAL

KUWAITI REACTION HAD BEEN THAT AGREEMENTS ARE INADEQUATE WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. I ADDED THAT AMIR HAD MADE POINT THAT CONCLUSION OF EGYPT/ISRAELI PEACE IS EGYPT'S OWN AFFAIR.

6. I TOLD HUSSEIN I HAD SPENT OVER AN HOUR WITH THE SHAH IN TEHRAN AND GAVE HIM A FACTUAL SUMMARY OF OUR PRIOR MEETINGS, FINDING HIM QUITE INTERESTED IN THE RE-

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SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07602 02 OF 04 281253Z  
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INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 AMMAN 07602  
EXDIS HANDLE NODIS

ACTIONS IN VARIOUS CAPITALS. I HAD STRESSED ADVANTAGES WE SEE IN THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AS PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK FROM WHICH A SOUND PROCESS CAN DEVELOP. I NOTED THAT THE SHAH HAD BEEN SENSITIVE TO AND SOLICITOUS ABOUT HUSSEIN'S PROBLEMS AND HAD ASKED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTIES HE IS FACING. THE SHAH HAD ALSO STRESSED THE POTENTIAL FOR SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF PRESENT ARAB DIFFERENCES AND HAD SEEN THIS AS DANGEROUS IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH YEMEN. I HAD RESPONDED THAT IF WE GET PEACE PROCESS MOVING EFFECTIVELY ON BASIS OF CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN MODERATES IN REGION AND BUILD A FRONT ISOLATING THE RADICALS. I HAD NOTED THE ALTERNATIVE IS STALEMATE, WITH ADVERSE STRATEGIC IMPLICATION FOR STATES IN REGION, INCLUDING DISADVANTAGE TO IRAN. I DESCRIBED THE SHAH AS REFLECTIVE AND CAREFULLY WEIGHING PROS AND CONS IN RELATION TO HOW THEY AFFECT IRAN'S INTERESTS. I SAID THAT AT THIS

TIME HE WAS NOT YET READY TO ADOPT A POSITION (HUSSEIN ASKED ABOUT THE SHAH'S MOOD AND I NOTED THAT OUR AMBASSADOR HAD FOUND HIM MORE CONFIDENT DURING THIS MEETING THAN ON  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 07602 02 OF 04 281253Z

RECENT OCCASIONS, THAT WHILE HE SEEMED A BIT PRE-OCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, HE CLEARLY IS TAKING A STRONG INTEREST IN WORLD AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS.)

7. I NOTED THAT IN ANKARA I HAD FOUND THE SENIOR CAREER FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS WITH WHOM I MET EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN OUR EXPLANATION OF AGREEMENTS AND POSING GOOD QUESTIONS EVIDENCING CONSIDERABLE FAMILIARITY WITH THE ISSUES.

8. HUSSEIN ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FOR HAVING ME RETURN TO BRIEF HIM. HE SAID THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS HE HAS PROMISED THE SECRETARY WOULD BE READY TOMORROW AND HE HOPED WE COULD ANSWER THEM PROMPTLY. (AFTER MEETING, SHARAF, WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT, EXPLAINED THAT DELAY IN SUBMITTING QUESTIONS WAS RESULT OF HUSSEIN'S DETERMINATION TO HAVE BROAD PARTICIPATION IN THEIR FORMULATION.) HUSSEIN SAID HE STILL HAD NUMEROUS QUESTIONS IN HIS MIND ABOUT THE AGREEMENTS AND THAT THE ANSWERS WOULD HELP HIM WITH HIS CONTACTS IN THE AREA, AND TO DECIDE HOW TO RESPOND. (IN THE COURSE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT REMARKS HE SEVERAL TIMES NOTED HIS PRESENT VIEWS ARE CONTINGENT UPON HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE ANSWERS WE PROVIDE HIM.) STRESSING THAT HE IS BOUND BY HIS HISTORICAL OBLIGATIONS TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE WHICH FUTURE GENERATIONS CAN ACCEPT, HUSSEIN OUTLINED BRIEFLY THE SORT OF CONCERNS HE HAD EXPRESSED TO SECRETARY EARLIER. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HIS MAIN CONCERN IS TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT U.S. POSITION IS, WHETHER IT HAS CHANGED OR ERODED. HE REFERRED TO THE YEARS THAT HAD PASSED WITH NO SETTLEMENT, TO THE HARMFUL NATURE OF BEGIN'S POST CAMP DAVID STATEMENTS, AND TO A REPORT FROM HIS AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO THAT EGYPT IS DETERMINED TO  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 07602 02 OF 04 281253Z

PRESS AHEAD IF JORDAN HESITATES. HE EMPHASIZED HE HAD BEEN "TAKEN COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE" BY CAMP DAVID OUTCOME.

9. HUSSEIN CONTINUED THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH ASSAD IN SEPTEMBER 26 MEETING TO COOPERATE IN FINDING CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK. HE STRESSED THAT HE

DID NOT WANT TO BE OBSTRUCTIVE AND THAT BOTH ASSAD AND HE REALIZED THEY STAND TO LOSE IF THERE IS NO PEACE. (LATER IN MEETING AMBASSADOR VELIOTES SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF NATURE OF CONSULTATIONS TO WHICH HUSSEIN AND ASSAD HAD AGREED, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THEY HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO REACH A JOINT POSITION. HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT THEY HAD ONLY AGREED TO EXPLORE WHETHER OR NOT THEY COULD COME UP WITH A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION. AT THAT POINT SHARAF INTERJECTED THAT HUSSEIN HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE WITH ASSAD TO URGE THAT SYRIAN REACTION TO CAMP DAVID SHOULD BE BASED ON "CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE" RATHER THAN NEGATIVE.) HUSSEIN CONTINUED THAT IN HIS CONTACTS HE HAD FOUND CERTAIN ARAB LEADERS DISAPPOINTED AND ANGRY. SOME MAY BE CONSIDERING CLOSER COOPERATION WITH SOVIETS AS COUNTER-BALANCE. KING NOTED THAT FOR MANY YEARS HE HAD FOUGHT AGAINST POLARIZATION IN ARAB WORLD, BUT THAT HE MUST STICK TO BEING ARAB. HE NOTED HE HAD BEEN PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY MEETING WITH QADHAFI AFTER MANY YEARS OF BAD RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM, THAT QADHAFI EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR THE BURDEN JORDAN BEARS AND HAD REPEATEDLY DURING THEIR MEETING TOLD ARAFAT THAT HE MUST SERVE AS SOLDIER UNDER THE KING'S BANNER. KING SAID HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT AS ARAFAT KNEW HE WAS READY FOR A DIALOGUE, BUT ADDED THAT HE WOULD PROCEED WITH SOME CAUTION.

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SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07602 03 OF 04 281259Z  
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 AMMAN 07602  
EXDIS HANDLE NODIS  
10. IN RESPONSE TO KING I ASSURED HIM THAT WE ARE

CONVINCED OF HIS DEDICATION TO PEACE AND I STRESSED THAT WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS WRITTEN QUESTIONS AND WOULD HOPE TO ANSWER THEM PROMPTLY. I EMPHASIZED AS GENERAL COMMENT THAT I COULD ASSURE HIM AUTHORITATIVELY THAT U.S. POSITIONS REMAIN COMPLETELY UNCHANGED FROM THOSE STATED OVER THE YEARS AND THAT WE WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO OUR POSITION ON 242. THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO IMPLEMENT OUR POSITIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE REGION OVER THE YEARS, SUCH AS THE EMERGENCE OF THE PLO, THE RABAT DECISIONS, AND THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. THIS FACTOR WAS MAIN CONSIDERATION BEHIND OUR CONCLUSION THAT WE NEED THE PROCESS OF TIME TO DEAL WITH SUCH COMPLEX ISSUES AS THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN ALL ITS RAMIFICATIONS. IN RESPONSE TO HIS CONCERN ABOUT BEGIN'S STATEMENTS I URGED HUSSEIN TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOVERNING FACTOR IS WHAT IS IN THE ACTUAL DOCUMENTS WHICH PRESIDENTS CARTER AND SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN SIGNED. WE INTEND TO STAND FIRMLY ON OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENTS AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO CONTRADICT ISRAELI INTERPRETATIONS AT SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 07602 03 OF 04 281259Z

VARIANCE WITH OUR OWN. IN THIS CONTEXT I ALSO STRESSED THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO FULL U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROCESS. HUSSEIN ASKED IF THE U.S. INTENDED TO LIMIT ITS ROLE AS PARTNER TO IMPLEMENTATION OF RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OR WHETHER WE WOULD BE A PARTNER "FROM THE WORD GO". I STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT WE WOULD BE A PARTNER "FROM THE WORD GO" AND THAT THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO STAY WITH THIS TO THE END HOWEVER LONG AND DIFFICULT. AS TO POSSIBILITY OF GREATER SOVIET ROLE IN AREA I NOTED MY ASSESSMENT THAT SOVIET INTEREST IN OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. PLACES AN IMPORTANT CONTRAINT ON THEIR GOING OFF THE DEEP END IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. IN CLOSING I ASSURED HUSSEIN WE UNDERSTAND HIS NEED FOR TIME TO REFLECT IN A COMPLICATED NEW SITUATION, AND HIS NEED TO TAKE SOUNDINGS INSIDE JORDAN AND WITH NEIGHBORS. I ASSURED HIM WE ARE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS, AND TO TALK WITH OTHERS IF HE WISHED. AS FINAL POINT I URGED THAT HE NOT IGNORE THE PRESENT PUBLIC DEBATE WITHIN ISRAEL ABOUT THE AGREEMENTS, EXPLAINING THAT WHATEVER THE ATTITUDE IN THE ARAB WORLD MAY BE ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH ISRAEL HAS MODIFIED ITS POSITIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT IN ISRAEL THE PEOPLE FEEL THEIR GOVERNMENT HAS MADE COMMITMENTS WHICH CALL ON THEM TO MAKE SACRIFICES, IF THEY ARE TO HAVE PEACE, WHICH WILL HAVE FAR REACHING CONSEQUENCES.

12. I MENTIONED TO HUSSEIN THAT IN MY NEXT STOP, JERU-

SALEM, I HOPED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH WEST BANK REPRESENTATIVES. HUSSEIN SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, WHO WAS PRESENT, ASKED OUR CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING WHICH WEST BANKERS TO SEE, AND I ASSURED HIM SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 07602 03 OF 04 281259Z

WE WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE JUDGMENT OF OUR CONSUL GENERAL, WHO MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH A WIDE SPECTRUM OF PALESTINIANS, AND NOT BY ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS. KING INDICATED THIS GAVE HIM NO PROBLEM BUT, IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY IF HE HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS WHOM I SHOULD SEE, SAID THIS WAS ENTIRELY UP TO US.

13. AMBASSADOR VELIOTES NOTED THAT WHEN WE RESPONDED TO KING'S QUESTIONS WE WOULD ASSUME HE WOULD FEEL FREE TO SHARE OUR ANSWERS WITH ASSAD. I ADDED THAT WE WOULD WELCOME A WIDE ARAB CONSULTATION ON OUR EXPLANATIONS OF AGREEMENTS. I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT AS HE CONSULTED WITH ASSAD ABOUT ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES HE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE HAD LOOKED VERY HARD AT ALTERNATIVES BEFORE WE DECIDED ON CAMP DAVID

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NONE THAT HELD PROMISE FOR MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE DIRECTION THAT WOULD SERVE THE INTEREST OF HUSSEIN AND OTHER ARAB MODERATES. HUSSEIN SAID ONE THING THAT HE WOULD HAVE IN MIND AS HE PROCEEDS WITH HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND OTHERS IS WHETHER THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS REALLY CALLED FOR JORDAN TO PLAY A FULL ROLE OR WHETHER THEY MERELY SEE JORDAN AS A POSSIBILITY FOR FILLING IN A FEW GAPS.

14. AT THE END HUSSEIN NOTED THAT THERE HAS BEEN "NO IMPROVEMENT" IN HIS RELATIONS WITH SADAT, WHO PROMISED WHEN AT CAMP DAVID TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH HIM BUT HAS NOT COMMUNICATED WITH HIM SINCE. INSTEAD SADAT HAD CHOSEN TO CRITICIZE HUSSEIN'S POSITION. AT THIS STAGE HUSSEIN WAS NOT CERTAIN HE WOULD ACCEPT ANY COMMUNICATION WHICH SADAT MIGHT CHOOSE TO SEND. HE REFERRED TO SADAT CRITICISM OF HIM AT RABAT AND SAID THAT THE SPEECH SADAT WILL GIVE

NOTE BY OC/T: SECTION 3 OF 4 AMMAN 7602; (#) OMISSION.

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SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 07602 03 OF 04 281259Z

CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07602 04 OF 04 281300Z  
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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 AMMAN 07602

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

TOMORROW COULD RESULT IN SADAT'S ORDERING HUSSEIN'S AMBAS-  
SADOR HOME OR HUSSEIN'S RECALLING HIM. HE DESCRIBED  
JORDANIAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS AS "LOWER THAN USUAL."

15. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION HUSSEIN NOTED HE HAD  
WRITTEN PRESIDENT CARTER THANKING HIM FOR HIS INVITATION  
AND EXPRESSING HOPE THAT A SUITABLE LATER DATE COULD BE  
FOUND FOR HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. VELIOTES

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## Message Attributes

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**Draft Date:** 28 sep 1978  
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**TAGS:** PGOV, PBOR, MPOL, PDIP, US, JO, IS, EG, ATHERTON, ALFRED L JR, (HUSSEIN I), (ATHERTON, ALFRED L JR)  
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